The Sender ID Standard

More help stopping spam


Nontechnical users often wonder why IT pros can't devise a clever solution to the spam problem. But those of us who have been around computers for a while know that the fight against spam is more of a chess game involving endurance and analytical skill than a football game featuring clever plays and stationary goals. As antispam tools improve, spammers find increasingly devious ways to evade them.

Most tools rely on identifying spam after a server has already accepted it for delivery—an approach that's hard on servers and bandwidth, and even harder on the users who have to wade through everything we don't catch. Because most spam is spoofed, a more robust method of identifying spoofed mail would be a big help in our struggle against spam. Ideally, such a system would provide a way for a server to determine whether the sending system is authorized to send mail for the DNS domain of which it claims to be a part. Such a tool would give our mail servers a way to answer a simple question that's very difficult to answer now: Where did this message really come from?

Two similar protocols—Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and Sender ID—provide a partial answer by letting you verify a message's sending domain. Before we get into the details of how these protocols work and what you can do with them, a brief history lesson is in order.

SPF, Caller ID, and Sender ID
In 2003, Meng Weng Wong started giving conference talks about a new antispam protocol called SPF. The protocol was well-received by the (mostly UNIX-oriented) audiences and began to gather momentum as it was adopted by a variety of ISPs, businesses, and antispam service providers. Not to be outdone, Microsoft published its Caller ID for E-mail standard in February 2004. Caller ID for E-mail had one important technical advantage in that it used XML, rather than plain text, to specify server identities. Although technical differences existed between the two protocols, they shared the same objective: allowing a mail server to verify the origins of sent messages. Both the SPF community and Microsoft realized that having two systems was less efficient—and less likely to vanquish spammers—than a unified system. So in June 2004, Wong and Microsoft announced the release of an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) draft specification for Sender ID, a unified system that combines the features of SPF and Caller ID for E-mail. SPF is already widely deployed, but Sender ID is the wave of the future, especially since it will probably be approved by the IETF as a standard within the next year or so.

Accordingly, this article deals primarily with Sender ID (although in some instances I'll point out significant differences between it and SPF). Unlike SPF and Caller ID for E-mail, SPF and Sender ID attempt to solve somewhat different problems: SPF concentrates solely on efficient spam rejection, whereas Sender ID extends domain verification to try to prevent some kinds of forgery and spoofing (including so-called phishing attacks).

How Sender ID Works
You probably already know of several server-based checks that you can perform to tell whether a message is spam. For example, Exchange Server lets you perform reverse DNS lookups for inbound messages and reject those messages that don't have a DNS PTR record. And of course, you can choose from a whole smorgasbord of tools that examine message headers and comments for telltale signs of spam. Microsoft has invested heavily in developing its SmartScreen technology, in use in the Exchange Intelligent Message Filter (IMF), Hotmail, and the Microsoft Office Outlook 2003 Junk E-mail Filter.

SPF and Sender ID, however, take a different approach. Each owner of a DNS domain is supposed to publish a record that specifies where that domain's email comes from. For example, in the simplest case, you might publish a record that says (in effect), All my mail comes from the servers registered in the MX records for my domains. This record corresponds with the MX record, which specifies where to send mail to for a particular domain. This system matches the successful processes of physical mail. SPF folks like to use the analogy of a letter that claims to be from (which is based in Seattle) but which carries a Nigerian postmark. You would quite rightly be suspicious of such a letter's authenticity. Likewise, you might be suspicious of a message that claims to be from Citibank but originates in China.

The basic process that Sender ID uses is simple. First, you publish a DNS TXT record that contains the Sender ID information for the DNS domains you own. You need do so only once. (I explain this process in the next section.) Users then send email just as they usually would; your Sender ID deployment is invisible to them. When a server that's using SPF or Sender ID receives a message from your domain, that server extracts the Purported Responsible Address (PRA), or in plain English, the mailbox that claims to have submitted the message. The Sender ID specification calls for the receiving server to determine the PRA by checking the message headers in the following order:

1.Check for the Resent-Sender header. If a nonempty Resent-Sender header is present and valid (e.g., contains only one IETF Request for Comments—RFC—2822 address) and no other headers are present, use that header as the PRA. If a nonempty Resent-Sender header is present but invalid, reject the message without determining a PRA. If no Resent-Sender header is present or if it appears after the Resent-From and Received or Return-Path headers, don't use the Resent-Sender header. Instead, proceed with the remaining checks until a PRA is determined or the message is rejected completely.

2.Check for the Resent-From header. If a nonempty, valid Resent-From header is present, use it as the PRA. If the Resent-From header is malformed or contains multiple mailboxes, reject the message without determining a PRA.

3.Check for the Delivered-To, X-Envelope-To, and Envelope-To headers. If one of these headers is present and nonempty, check it for validity. If it contains multiple names, reject the message without determining a PRA. Otherwise, return the contents of the first found header as the PRA.

4.Check for the Sender header. If more than one Sender header is present, reject the message without determining a PRA. If only one, nonempty Sender header is present but contains more than one mailbox or is otherwise malformed, reject the message without determining a PRA. If only one, nonempty Sender header is present and valid, return its contents as the PRA.

5.Check for the From header. If more than one From header exists, reject the message without determining a PRA. If only one, nonempty From header is present but contains more than one mailbox or is otherwise malformed, reject the message without determining a PRA. If only one, non-empty From header is present and valid, return its contents as the PRA.

As you can see, this process checks headers in a particular order, which is determined by the difficulty of spoofing that particular header (e.g., the From header, which is the easiest to spoof, is checked last). At each step, if the header is either well formed or clearly malformed, it can be used to extract the PRA or reject the message. If the selected header doesn't exist, the next header in the sequence is checked. The net result of this process is that either we get a PRA, or we don't. If we don't, the rest of the Sender ID checks are moot; the Sender ID specification suggests rejecting the message immediately.

If the receiving server is able to extract a PRA, the server then needs to extract the domain portion of the PRA, which gives us the Purported Responsible Domain (PRD). The server can then use the PRD to perform a DNS query for the PRD's SPF or Sender ID record, more properly known as an E-mail Policy Document. If an E-mail Policy Document exists, the DNS query will return it, giving the receiving mail server a list of IP addresses that are authorized to send mail on behalf of the sending domain.

If the IP address from which the message originates appears in the E-mail Policy Document, the message can be accepted. If not, the message can be accepted but should be subjected to more stringent spam checks because it appears to come from an unlikely source. Some subtleties in this process make it rather interesting. Depending on the results of the lookup process, the Sender ID specification defines the following six values:

  • Pass means that the E-mail Policy Document exists, has been checked against the PRD, and matches the PRD. In this case, the server can accept the message as valid.
  • Fail means that the E-mail Policy Document exists but doesn't match the PRD. In this case, the server should reject the message as invalid, returning an SMTP 500 error.
  • SoftFail indicates that the PRD and E-mail Policy Document don't match, but that legitimate reasons for the failure might exist. Accordingly, the specification calls for the SMTP server to accept the message but to give it additional scrutiny.
  • Neutral means that the server can't get enough information to make a decision about the message, most likely because no E-mail Policy Document exists. As with SoftFail, the server should accept the message but consider it fair game for other spam filters.
  • TransientError indicates that the checking process couldn't be completed because of DNS troubles. The SMTP server can bounce the message with an SMTP 450 error or accept the message and give it closer inspection. Such action is what most SMTP servers do when they have transient DNS errors: They send out a failure notice, then keep trying to deliver the message for a specified period.
  • HardError means that the server has encountered an invalid E-mail Policy Document or that the checking process was aborted for some reason. The specification calls for this result to be treated like the Neutral value.
  • None merely means that no E-mail Policy Document exists for the sending domain, and thus Sender ID wasn't used to make any sort of determination.
  • The goal behind having this hierarchy of values is that a message that clearly passes (because its E-mail Policy Document matches) can bypass other, more resource-intensive antispam checks. This filtering helps reduce the overhead required for existing schemes on servers that accept large volumes of mail, but can slow message processing if external services have to be used to verify PRDs and E-mail Policy Documents.

    Publishing Your Sender ID Record
    The Sender ID checking process is relatively complicated, but the beauty of it is that the SMTP server has to do all the work. As an administrator, all you have to do is make sure that a server using Sender ID or SPF can find an E-mail Policy Document for your domain. This requirement turns out to be easy, although it is one area in which SPF and Sender ID diverge widely. SPF uses plaintext records (which you can generate easily by using the SPF Wizard available at, whereas Sender ID uses a more structured, XML record (the exact structure is defined in the Sender ID specification at http://

    Web Listing 1 (, InstantDoc ID 43917) shows a simple example of a Sender ID E-mail Policy Document. Each E-mail Policy Document must contain an <ep> element, which is the XML container for the record. The optional <out> element specifies the E-mail Policy Document. The <m> element specifies which servers are permitted to send mail for the domain. You can have one or several <m> elements in each <out> element. In the example that Web Listing 1 shows, the only specified element is <mx>, which tells the server that the only authorized sending hosts are the ones registered in the domain's MX records. You can also use the <r> element to specify an IP address range (e.g.,, the <a> element to specify a single IP address, or the <include> element to specify a list of addresses.

    Once you've created the XML record, the next step is to publish it. The trick is to create a new subdomain for your domain and name the subdomain This is a handy approach because you can create such subdomains for any or all of the domains in your organization without any outside help (unless you outsource your DNS service). For my home lab, I set up, which holds one DNS TXT record that contains the E-mail Policy Document for my domain. That's it! After the E-mail Policy Document is published in the correct subdomain for your domain, servers that use Sender ID can validate email sent by your users.

    Reaching Critical Mass
    The first, and most immediate, objection to most schemes that attempt to address SMTP security is that anything that requires changes to a large percentage of SMTP servers won't be widely adopted. Although that statement is certainly true, it's also true that just a few domains—namely, AOL, Hotmail, MSN, and Yahoo!—generate an overwhelmingly large percentage of the email sent over the Internet; thus, any scheme that those domains adopt has a much better chance of being widely adopted by default. Microsoft recently announced that it will start using Sender ID to check inbound messages to Hotmail, MSN, and addresses. This step is an important one, especially because AOL already uses SPF (as do several thousand other mail senders of various sizes). As the tools for implementing and checking Sender ID improve, I expect to see the protocols become much more widely deployed. In any event, the process of adding a Sender ID record for your domain is so simple that there's no good reason why you shouldn't do so immediately.

    Objections to Sender ID Deployment
    Of course, not everyone agrees. As with every technology developed since the invention of the wheel, Sender ID has its opponents. Some of the criticisms leveled at Sender ID also apply to SPF. I mention them here solely because you'll probably hear them yourself at some point during the Sender ID lifecycle:

  • Sender ID isn't widely deployed. It's more accurate to say that Sender ID isn't widely deployed yet. Microsoft's implementation will give the standard some valuable momentum.
  • Not all SMTP servers support Sender ID. True, most don't—at this point, even Exchange doesn't support it, and recent maneuvering by various open-source community groups indicates that the standard's adoption by that community could be slow. It's a safe bet, though, that Exchange Edge Services will provide full Sender ID support, and I wouldn't be surprised if Microsoft has plans to add support in Exchange Server 2003 at some point. In any event, writing an event sink to provide SPF or Sender ID support would be fairly straightforward. More important, implementing Sender ID helps guarantee that your users' email won't be marked as spam by AOL, Hotmail, MSN, or Yahoo!.
  • Sender ID doesn't stop 100 percent of spam. No, but it does raise the bar and make it a little harder for spammers to send forged email. Forging headers is a particular problem for users and for companies such as eBay and Citibank, which phishers pick on. Anything that cuts down on those types of attacks is a good thing. As Wong says on his Web site, "SPF aims to prevent spammers from ruining other people's reputations. If they want to send spam, they should at least do it under their own name."
  • SPF and Sender ID don't authenticate users. True. Therefore, both specifications suggest adding a separate SMTP extension that (when used with SMTP AUTH) includes a header that indicates which user sent the message. This practice exchanges an additional degree of message assurance with a decrease in user privacy, however. Whether that tradeoff is a reasonable one remains to be seen.
  • Mailing lists and forwarding services will break. Mailing lists, forwarding services such as, and other tools that accept and resend email might fail SPF and Sender ID checks. But that's why both protocols check more than one header. Most mailing list software already adds Sender headers, and you can easily configure your lists to use the Sender ID­recommended Resent-From header instead.
  • Is This the Future?
    Will Sender ID eliminate spam? Probably not. However, in conjunction with other tools and techniques (including client- and server-side heuristic filtering, better client security to keep clients from being compromised and used as spam robots, and financial pressure against spammers), it can only help. As Sender ID and SPF become more widely deployed, they'll take their places alongside other technologies as valuable assets in spam fighting. In the meantime, I suggest you obtain more information about these protocols and their deployment. SPF's master Web site ( includes useful slide presentations that highlight the specific problems SPF is designed to address and a comprehensive archive of the SPF-discussion mailing list. The Sender ID Web site ( provides three interesting documents: an executive overview of Sender ID's purpose, a guide for administrators who want to implement it, and a copy of the draft IETF standard proposal—well worth reading if you really want to understand how Sender ID works.

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